Critical Malware Feed Entry Detected 2026-08-20
Malware feed entry — detected by codelake scanners. This package was flagged malicious by our own detection pipeline. See the rules that fired and the package identifiers below. Full analysis, timeline and IOCs live on hand-curated advisories at /advisories; this page is the machine-generated receipt for the live feed.
Detection details
@leejungkiin/[email protected] published to npm, flagged by codelake scanners on 2026-08-20 09:41 UTC.
Detector rules that fired on this package:
- Package ships a .env file (may contain secrets): symphony/multica-ref/apps/desktop/.env.production — secret/credential leak via the registry
behavior.shipped.credential-file - Package ships a private key / certificate file: docs/research/reverse-skills-study/haikow-reverse-skills/skills/apk-reverse/debug.keystore — secret/credential leak via the registry
behavior.shipped.credential-file - Source writes to an AI-agent config/instruction file (CLAUDE.md / .claude / .cursor / MCP config / copilot-instructions / agent rules) — agent-control-surface tampering
behavior.static.agent-config-tamper - Source spawns a child process with a non-literal command
behavior.static.child-spawn-dynamic - Source executes a string as code (new Function / vm.run* / setTimeout("...")) — dynamic-eval pattern
behavior.static.dynamic-exec - Source loads a module from a non-literal name — opaque dependency
behavior.static.dynamic-require - Source issues a PUT/POST request reading local files, with a sensitive source or suspicious destination — outbound file-upload exfil
behavior.static.exfil-outbound-upload - Source contains a hard-coded GitHub token (ghp_/gho_/ghu_/ghs_/ghr_) — leaked credential
behavior.static.github-token - Source contains a hard-coded ephemeral URL (raw IP / .top / .xyz / pastebin / discord webhook)
behavior.static.hidden-fetch - Source collects host/identity fingerprint (hostname/userInfo/networkInterfaces) and makes an outbound call — recon beacon
behavior.static.recon-beacon - Source reads a credential-shaped env var and exfiltrates it (encoding / file-harvest / C2 context) alongside an outbound call
behavior.static.secret-exfil - Source references a sensitive filesystem path (~/.ssh, /mnt/user-data, .aws/credentials, ...) — secret/workspace harvest
behavior.static.sensitive-path - Source references a C2 / exfil host (Telegram bot API, ngrok, webhook.site, requestbin, oast/interactsh, transfer.sh) — near-exclusive to malware
behavior.static.suspicious-host
OSV reference: MAL-2026-13427
This is an auto-generated entry in the codelake malware feed. Hand-curated deep case studies live on /advisories.